| |
|
|
| |
Home
>
World
> Middle East
> Iraq
|
History and Government
History: Mesopotamia – the core of modern Iraq – was at the heart of the Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian empires between the seventh century BC and AD 100. After brief spells under the rule of the Romans and the Sassanids (a minor regional power at the time), the Arabs conquered Iraq in AD 633. The Arab Caliphate had control of the territory during the late 12th and early 13th centuries before being dislodged by the Mongols. At the end of the 14th century Iraq, Azerbaijan to the north, Persia and parts of Turkey, Syria and Transcaucasia were conquered and subsumed into the empire ruled by Timur (also known as Tamerlane). The Turks were the next imperial invaders, ruling from the early 1500s until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.
In 1920, Iraq was placed under a League of Nations mandate administered by the UK, whose forces had occupied most of the country. The Hashemite Amir Faisal ibn Hussain, brother of the new ruler of neighbouring Jordan, Abdallah, was proclaimed King in 1921. The country achieved independence in 1932, but British forces intervened once again in 1941 to prevent a pro-Nazi coup. British troops were finally withdrawn in 1947. In 1958, the Hashemite Dynasty was overthrown by a group of radical army officers inspired by the example of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and led by Brigadier Abdul al-Karim Kassem. The new regime failed to consolidate its position, however, and relied on a precarious coalition of forces, which quickly disintegrated.
After Kassem was killed in 1963 during a further coup, Colonel Abdul Salem Muhammed Aref set up a new government. Iraq declared war on Israel at the outbreak of the Six-Day War in June 1967, although Iraqi forces were not engaged. In 1968, Iraq’s final coup in recent history brought to power the Ba’ath Party. Ba’ath ideology espouses pan-Arabism, socialism and resistance to foreign interference, although many political scientists have noted its similarity to European fascism. Ba’athism was originally brought into Iraq from Syria during the 1950s and grew quickly. As it did so, however, the Syrian and Iraqi strains grew apart from one another and by the end of the 1960s were mutually hostile.
Since then, relations between Iraq and Syria have deteriorated still further: a decade later, Syria was a willing participant in the USA-led coalition which expelled Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait. In July 1979, after a power struggle within the Ba’ath Party, Vice President Saddam Hussein took over as President and party leader. Saddam’s main objectives were to establish his country as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and to overcome the Arabs’ two principal enemies in the Middle East, Iran and Israel. Saddam reached the top at a time of escalating tension between Iran and Iraq. Iran appeared to be in chaos following the Islamic revolution which overthrew the Shah. The Iraqis perceived a good opportunity to resolve a long-running territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway which feeds the Gulf and divides the two countries.
The Iraqis revoked a settlement of the dispute reached in 1975 and launched a full-scale invasion of Iran in September 1980. In the face of unexpectedly stiff Iranian resistance, the Iraqis failed to win the decisive military victory they had hoped for and the war degenerated into one of attrition, employing tactics similar to those of World War I. As in Europe 70 years earlier, use was made of poison gas – initially against massed ranks of Iranian troops and then later against the civilian population. This was the first confirmation of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction as well as a huge arsenal of conventional weaponry.
The fighting lasted until August 1988 when the two exhausted nations sued for peace with Iraq having made some minor territorial gains. The Iraqi economy was crippled and had incurred an enormous foreign debt, much of which was owed to neighbouring Kuwait: this became a serious source of friction between the two governments over the next two years.
Insistent demands by the Kuwaitis for repayment, Iraq’s historical claim over Kuwaiti territory (dating back to the 1920s), and a dispute over oil reserves provided the main pretext for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The American-led response to the invasion, which received firm backing from the UN in the form of mandatory sanctions and an authorisation to use military force, surprised the Iraqis. By the beginning of March 1991, the Iraqi armed forces had suffered a massive defeat and the Iraqi regime itself was under serious threat from armed opposition elements among the predominantly Shia population of southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north. However, the superior firepower of Iraqi troops – some held in reserve, some reorganised from units fleeing the UN coalition –was sufficient to defeat the rebels. The Western refusal to provide effective backing for the rebels was based on the lack of a UN mandate (which had only endorsed the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait) as well as the practical fear of a ‘Balkanised’ post-Saddam Iraq whereby the country splits into three mutually antagonistic entities (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish respectively).
Thereafter, the USA, supported by Britain and others, used several means to constrain Iraq. ‘No-fly’ zones were established, covering the north and south of the country, in which all Iraqi air movement was forbidden (this allowed the Kurds to create an effectively autonomous region within the country). A UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was formed to try to locate and destroy the remaining stocks and production facilities of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological warfare programmes. Iraq was also subject to a complete trade embargo excepting a strictly controlled regimen of oil sales, the proceeds of which the Iraqi government could use to buy food and medicines.
By 1998, Iraq had developed sufficient means of circumventing sanctions and political confidence to throw out the UNSCOM inspectors. International support for the sanctions regime had waned to point where only the US and Britain still backed its continued use. The two countries police the ‘no-fly’ zones and launch occasional bomb attacks (about one a month) on Iraqi military and strategic installations.
At home, Saddam’s position is as strong as ever, although he continues to suffer a haemorrhage of senior and experienced personnel escaping into exile. His two sons, Uday and Qusay, are being groomed for the succession – the increasingly bitter rivalry between them is becoming a central feature of Iraqi domestic politics. In the meantime, Saddam has put his country on a virtual war footing. The US administration of George W Bush (son of President George Bush who presided over the 1991 Gulf war) appears to consider Iraq ‘unfinished business’ and, in the vengeful mood following the attacks of 11 September, to have set itself on the removal of Saddam by any means. There are two main problems for the Americans: finding a replacement for Saddam – no easy task given the chaotic and discordant nature of the Iraqi opposition – and managing the unpredictable consequences of launching a full-scale war in a region already in political ferment.
Government: Since 1970, the supreme political body has been the nine-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Its chairman is President Saddam Hussein. The National Assembly consists of 250 delegates and formally shares responsibility for legislation with the RCC, although in practice the decisions of the latter are ritually endorsed by the Assembly.
Copyright © 2003 Columbus Publishing Ltd.
Terms and Conditions apply.
|
|
|
|
|
